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Myanmar: The Beginning of Reforms 
and the End of Sanctions 
Marco Bünte and Clara Portela
On 23 April 2012, the European Union (EU) suspended its sanctions against Burma/
Myanmar in response to a series of domestic political reforms that have been enacted 
since Thein Sein became the new president in March 2011. 
Analysis 
Since March 2011, Burma/Myanmar has witnessed a liberalization of the press, the re-
lease of political prisoners and the initiation of a political dialogue between the regime 
on the one hand and the opposition and ethnic groups on the other. The reforms cul-
minated in by-elections on 1 April 2012, which in turn resulted in a landslide victory 
for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). Overall, political re-
forms in Burma/Myanmar are being initiated from “above.” They are elite-driven and 
stem from the president and progressive members of the military-dominated party, the 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). 
  Political reforms in Myanmar are a regime reaction to both internal and external fac-
tors. Internally, the military felt secure enough to embark on the slow liberalization 
of the political system. Externally, the growing economic presence of China seems 
to have worried the generals.
  Progress is, however, slow, uneven and very fragile. Hard-liners within the regime 
still threaten the reform process. Moreover, the influence of the military within the 
political system and the economy is still pervasive. 
  The EU has responded to the reforms by suspending almost all existing sanctions, 
with the exception of the arms embargo and the withdrawal of trade preferences, 
while starting to employ “carrots” such as development aid.
  By EU standards, agreement on the suspension of the virtual entirety of sanctions 
has been reached remarkably swiftly. The exclusion of the arms embargo from the 
suspension reflects the EU’s policies on armaments supply. The resumption of trade 
preferences will require a separate, lengthier legal process. 
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Authoritarianism and Political Reforms in 
Myanmar
Burma/Myanmar1 is generally regarded as one of 
the most enduring authoritarian regimes in the 
world. The military has been directly or indirect-
ly in power since the coup in 1962. The refusal of 
the military junta to recognize the results of the 
1990 elections, which were won by the Nation-
al League of Democracy (NLD), elicited the im-
position of sanctions by the EU along with oth-
er Western actors such as the US, Canada, Nor-
way and Australia. The country is also regarded 
as one of the most repressive regimes worldwide 
due to the lack of human rights and political free-
doms. However, since the inauguration of Pres-
ident Thein Sein in March 2011, the country has 
been on a slow reform course, which has so far re-
sulted in the relaxation of many authoritarian con-
trols. This paper evaluates the progress made in 
Myanmar’s liberalization and identifies the driv-
ers behind this progress and the main challeng-
es it faces on the way forward. Moreover, it anal-
yses the EU’s response to and support for the re-
form course. 
Since the transfer of power to a civilian govern-
ment in March 2011, the authoritarian country has 
embarked on a course of slow political liberaliza-
tion “from above.” The new president, Thein Sein, 
a former military general and a member of the 
military junta (SPDC), has initiated some major 
reforms. These have changed the country dramat-
ically: Over 700 political prisoners were released 
in October 2011 and January 2012. The coun-
try’s strict media regulations have been relaxed. 
The government has also relaxed internal censor-
ship laws and unblocked the websites of exile ra-
dio and TV stations (Democratic Voice of Burma, 
Voice of America). The consequence is a much fre-
er press, which now also covers the activities of 
the main opposition party. The government has 
also established the independent National Human 
Rights Commission and passed new legislation 
that allows for labor unions and the right to strike. 
Moreover, the new president has initiated a 
political dialogue with both the political opposi-
tion and ethnic groups. He has met several times 
with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who 
1 The military regime changed the name of the country from 
Burma to Myanmar in July 1989. While the EU has officially 
adopted the use of both names Burma/Myanmar, we use the 
name Myanmar for the sake of simplicity. 
has described him as “an honest man […] a man 
capable of taking risks if he thinks they are worth 
taking” (BBC 2012). The main opposition party, 
the National League for Democracy (NLD), which 
had boycotted the 2010 elections, decided to rereg-
ister as a political party in order to compete in the 
by-elections on 1 April 2012. The elections, which 
were deemed free and fair by most international 
observers, have resulted in a strengthened oppo-
sition movement. The president has also signed 
peace agreements with most of the ethnic groups 
that have been fighting the central government for 
decades. 
The country’s reform process is ongoing but 
fragile; at the moment it is impossible to say 
whether it will lead to real democratization or to 
a different form of authoritarian rule. The driv-
ing forces behind the reforms are the new presi-
dent and liberal elements within the ruling Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). They 
face fierce opposition from hard-liners within the 
USDP and the military. Consequently, the way to 
democracy will inevitably be rocky and danger-
ous. 
The Background to the Fragile Reforms
There are both internal and external explanations 
for the initiation of political reforms. The most im-
portant internal factor was the retirement of se-
nior general Than Shwe in March 2011 and the es-
tablishment of a new power structure in the au-
thoritarian regime. The resignation of Than Shwe 
and the senior guard of the military junta allowed 
for a smooth transition to a newer generation of 
military generals. At the same time, senior mem-
bers of the former ruling military junta were given 
top positions in the new government. There was 
thus no breakdown of military rule, and the mil-
itary managed to consolidate its position within 
a new authoritarian setting. Over several years, 
the military regime had drafted a new institution-
al framework under the banner of the seven-stage 
roadmap to “disciplined democracy.” This road-
map was implemented between 2003 and 2011. A 
new constitution was drafted, a referendum was 
held in 2008, and elections took place in 2010. This 
process involved hardly any input from the oppo-
sition or ethnic groups and was completely dom-
inated by the military; it primarily reflected the 
military’s view of the world: the resulting state 
structure was rather centralist and did not mirror 
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the country’s overall heterogeneity. The military’s 
predominant position was institutionalized in a 
political system that balanced military hard-liners 
and military soft-liners from the former SPDC in 
a new electoral authoritarian setting (Bünte 2011). 
Within this new power structure, the soft-lin-
ers within the new regime ultimately felt secure 
enough to embark on a gradual opening-up of 
the political system. The driving forces behind 
the most recent reforms have so far been Presi-
dent Thein Sein and the speaker of the parliament, 
Shwe Mann. The reforms have had the backing of 
the military leadership, which still plays an im-
portant role in politics. The most important minis-
try is the National Defense and Security Council, 
an 11-member body chaired by Thein Sein and the 
military’s commander in chief, General Min Aung 
Hlaing, which discusses security and other ma-
jor issues of national concern. The power play be-
tween hard-liners and soft-liners takes place with-
in this body (Bangkok Post 2012). Reforms, there-
fore, are slow but are based on consensual agree-
ments supported by the top military leadership. 
This minimizes the risk of a military coup. Anoth-
er important factor in this respect is the seniority 
of the new president. Since seniority plays a huge 
role in Myanmar, it is important that Thein Sein is 
actually more senior than the current command-
er of the armed forces, General Min Aung Hlaing. 
The most important international factor influ-
encing Myanmar’s reforms has been China’s large 
and growing economic presence in the country, 
which seems to have worried the generals. Due to 
the huge Chinese investment in Myanmar’s infra-
structure and energy sectors in recent years, the 
regime seems to have felt the need to balance Chi-
na’s presence in the country. The opening-up to 
the West, therefore, is intended to rid Myanmar 
of the Chinese embrace. The reforms are meant to 
be a sign to the international community, especial-
ly the EU and the US, to engage with the coun-
try. A second important factor has been the clear 
message sent by ASEAN that it expects progress 
on democratization and human rights if Myanmar 
wants to take the chair of the regional organiza-
tion in 2014. The West’s sanctions can be viewed 
as an additional trigger, since the gradual reform 
of the country can only succeed with help from 
the outside. The question now is what remains to 
be done in terms of democratization and ethnic 
reconciliation.
Challenges for Democratization and Ethnic 
Reconciliation
There is still a long way to go to democratization, 
as the reforms have so far been very uneven. Al-
though the media is now much freer and censor-
ship is increasingly becoming obsolete, it still ex-
ists. In light of the political reforms and ongoing 
censorship, the “Reporters without Borders’ Press 
Freedom Index 2011” gave Myanmar a slight-
ly better ranking (169) than in the previous year 
(174). The new media legislation presented in ear-
ly February 2012 is believed to be based on the in-
famous Printers and Publishers Registration Law, 
which was introduced shortly after the military 
coup in 1962. Skeptics fear ongoing censorship. 
There are many political topics, such as corrup-
tion, civil war and government mismanagement, 
that still cannot be reported on. Journalists are not 
allowed to attend peace talks between the govern-
ment and the ethnic groups. The media is far from 
free, since the government so far is reluctant to 
amend old censorship laws. Journalists often have 
to work under cover and are under close scrutiny 
(Zinn 2012). 
Another pressing issue is the release of politi-
cal prisoners. Although many high-ranking pris-
oners have been released in recent months (for ex-
ample, comedian Zanagar and 1988 student lead-
er Min Ko Naing), a number of political prisoners 
still remain behind bars. According to the Assis-
tance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 
there are still approximately 300 political prison-
ers in the country. Although the concrete num-
bers are contested, the simple existence of political 
prisoners is a serious deficit in the reform process. 
Additionally, there are a huge number of hu-
man rights abuses that need to be addressed. The 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
recently insisted that the practice of forced labor 
be stopped before the international communi-
ty lifts its sanctions (Barber 2012). Although the 
government has already taken some steps to end 
forced labor, the practice is often carried out by 
recalcitrant local (military) authorities over which 
the central government does not have enough le-
verage. The problem is the state’s weak capacity 
and the lack of civilian control over the military. 
The latter issue was also highlighted in December 
2011, when President Thein Sein unsuccessfully 
ordered the military to stop its offensive in Kachin 
State. The military, which sees itself as the guard-
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ian of national integrity, continued with this ac-
tion. 
The other issue is the political system itself, 
which is heavily tilted towards the military and 
the military-dominated USDP party. The military 
holds 25 percent of the seats in parliament, while 
the USDP won 76 percent of all seats (in all legis-
latures) in the 2010 elections. Although recent by-
elections have enhanced the power of the politi-
cal opposition (NLD), it still has far too little pow-
er to initiate a genuine reform process. The cur-
rent parliament is by no means a unified pro- 
reform actor. It has already voted down several 
reform initiatives – for instance, the liberalization 
of the press laws. To initiate a genuine reform pro-
cess, constitutional reforms would have to be initi-
ated and these would diminish the extreme pow-
er of the military. Most ministries (Interior, Bor-
der) are de facto reserved for former military of-
ficers, and to change this, the constitution would 
have to be changed. Such constitutional change, 
however, would require the support of 75 percent 
of the legislature and approval in a referendum. 
The military consequently has veto power over 
any far-reaching reform. The initiation of a genu-
ine reform process is thus an uphill struggle, espe-
cially where the most important themes, such as 
military dominance and civilian control, are con-
cerned. 
Another challenge is the complex question of 
national reconciliation. By February 2012 initial 
peace agreements had been reached with most of 
the armed ethnic groups that have been fighting 
for more autonomy for more than half a centu-
ry. These ceasefire agreements signal a significant 
break with the failed ethnic policies of the past. 
However, decades of civil war and human rights 
violations have created deep mistrust between the 
ethnic groups and the military. Consequently, it 
is possible that without a clear roadmap for po-
litical negotiations and reforms, the current peace 
initiative will fail and will end in renewed fight-
ing. The president envisions the completion of 
the initial ceasefire agreements, followed by po-
litical talks at the national level and the discussion 
of key issues in parliament. The third stage of his 
plan envisions a new national conference, which 
is something many ethnic politicians have been 
calling for. This last stage, which could lead to a 
new framework for center–regional relations and 
true federalism, has the potential to draw opposi-
tion from the hard-liner elements in the military 
and could trigger a coup on their part. 
A Complex Package of Sanctions 
After decades of a complete stalemate in Myan-
mar, the West has unexpectedly found itself faced 
with a situation where some progress, however 
limited and fragile, is being made. The question 
of whether these limited steps should be recipro-
cated with the easing of existing sanctions has al-
ready been answered in the affirmative: both the 
US and the EU as well as other Western donors 
such as Australia and Norway started to unfreeze 
aid and reestablish diplomatic ties in early 2012. 
Most significantly, the EU suspended all sanctions 
– except for the arms embargo and the withdrawal 
of trade privileges – at the meeting of foreign min-
isters on 23 April 2012. The EU’s decision to sus-
pend the sanctions rather than lifting them alto-
gether was motivated by a desire to recognize the 
reforms already initiated while encouraging fur-
ther progress. The delicate nature of the phasing-
out of sanctions is obvious: On the one hand, the 
sender aims to exert sufficient pressure through-
out the process to compel the target to make con-
cessions. On the other hand, the target needs to be 
rewarded with the partial easing of sanctions as 
an incentive to effect further reforms. But which 
sanctions did the EU have in place, and why have 
some been suspended earlier than others? 
The range of sanctions imposed against Myan-
mar by the EU since 1991 is a heterogeneous mix. 
These sanctions did not result from a predesigned 
plan, but were rather wielded gradually and artic-
ulated in accordance with the impulses provided 
by a series of civil society campaigns. In response 
to the military leadership’s refusal to hand over 
power to the NLD after the latter’s victory in the 
1990 elections, the EU imposed an arms embargo 
and suspended aid. These measures were supple-
mented with incremental upgrades in response to 
periodic incidents of violent repression. Over the 
years, the sanctions came to encompass measures 
such as a visa ban for high-ranking officials and 
a ban on the export of equipment for the timber 
and gems industries. According to the last Com-
mon Position, which consolidated all sanctions 
measures agreed upon by the EU prior to Myan-
mar’s political opening-up in 2011 (see Common 
Position 2010/232/CFSP), EU sanctions against the 
country consisted of the following:
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1) A set of measures applied only to a blacklist 
featuring designated individuals, mostly mem-
bers of the military junta and their associates, 
including
• a visa ban and the freezing of assets for mem-
bers of the junta and high-ranking military offi-
cers, authorities in the tourism sector, and fam-
ily members.
This measure, meant to affect the targeted in-
dividuals in their personal capacity, was com-
plemented with a traditional diplomatic sanc-
tion, namely, the suspension of high-level bilat-
eral governmental visits. 
2) A number of measures were directed at the mil-
itary establishment. These included a sectoral 
embargo and, again, a diplomatic sanction: 
• Embargo on arms and military equipment.
• Ban on the attachment of military personnel to 
the diplomatic representations of Myanmar in 
EU member states, as well as on the attachment 
of military personnel to diplomatic representa-
tions of the member states in Myanmar.
3) Finally, a series of measures intended to affect 
certain sectors of the economy, including some 
selective embargoes: 
• The suspension of nonhumanitarian aid (with 
some exceptions permitted for projects in sup-
port of human rights, democracy, good gover-
nance, conflict prevention, capacity-building 
for civil society, health and education, poverty 
alleviation, and environmental protection).
• An investment and loan ban, including exten-
sions of participation in state-owned enterpris-
es, and a ban on the creation of joint ventures.
• A ban on the export of equipment and technol-
ogy – and the provision of technical or financial 
assistance – to enterprises engaged in logging 
and timber processing and the mining of metals 
and precious and semiprecious stones.
• A ban on the import of round logs, timber prod-
ucts, metals, and precious and semiprecious 
stones.
4) In addition to the sanctions adopted under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
Myanmar had its trade privileges under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) cut 
off in March 1997 in response to the practice 
of forced labor. Technically, the withdraw-
al of the GSP is not considered a sanction, giv-
en that its effect is simply to reestablish normal 
trade flows. Myanmar was the first instance of 
EU withdrawal of GSP preferences, and was 
the only case until a similar decision was tak-
en on Belarus (Portela 2010). Due to its status 
as one of the worlds’ least developed countries 
(LDCs), Myanmar would normally be eligible 
for the EU’s most favorable GSP scheme, “Ev-
erything But Arms” (EBA), if it were not under 
suspension. EBA provides products originat-
ing from the LDCs with duty-free access to the 
EU in order to promote their development and 
their integration into the world market.2 
Phasing Out Targeted Sanctions 
The Myanmar package is atypically broad com-
pared to other EU sanctions regimes, which rou-
tinely consist of a combination of a visa ban for the 
leadership and an arms embargo. Many of these 
sanctions replicate measures adopted previously 
(or simultaneously) by the US, which are, for var-
ious reasons, often copied by the EU. Yet despite 
their broadness, the sanctions imposed on Myan-
mar by the EU are “targeted” sanctions. In con-
trast to the comprehensive trade embargoes that 
characterized international practice for much of 
the 1990s, targeted sanctions are designed to can-
alize harm towards specific individuals, elites, or 
economic sectors, rather than crippling the tar-
get’s economy as a whole. Trade between the 
EU and Myanmar has never been fully banned. 
Indeed, according to recent statistics, the EU is 
Myanmar’s ninth trading partner and its biggest 
trading partner outside Asia.3 Development aid 
has never been interrupted: the United Kingdom 
has long been Myanmar’s main donor (although 
aid was obviously not channeled through the au-
thorities). While all EU measures fall under the 
rubric of “targeted sanctions” they are not equal-
ly discriminating: as discussed in the above over-
view, some affect only explicitly blacklisted indi-
viduals, while others affect broader sections of the 
population (and are thus more likely to display 
unintended consequences). 
The targeted character of sanctions has key 
consequences for their lifting. When full embar-
goes – as in Iraq or the former Yugoslavia – are 
removed, the sender’s leverage disappears over-
2 See COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 
2011 for the latest arrangements. The GSP scheme is currently 
being revised: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:211:0001:0039:EN:PDF> (14 May 2012).
3 See Myanmar’s trade with main partners (2010): <http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113423.
pdf> (14 May 2012).
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night. In contrast to this “all-or-nothing” scenar-
io, targeted sanctions allow senders to negotiate 
a progressive lifting in exchange for concessions 
– precisely what the EU has been doing. The de-
bate on sanctions against Myanmar, traditional-
ly characterized by a sharp division between two 
camps holding maximalist positions (the “anti-
sanctions” and the “pro-sanctions” camps), has 
largely failed to realize that targeted measures 
opened up possibilities unavailable with compre-
hensive sanctions. Indeed, senders have scarce-
ly utilized the option of gradualism. When Libya 
started to comply with the demands of the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council, the latter reacted by 
suspending the sanctions as an intermediate mea-
sure somewhere between continuation and lifting. 
Interestingly, it has been in the hardly publicized 
exercise of aid sanctions against African, Caribbe-
an and Pacific countries that the EU has made its 
most skillful use of a gradual and conditional ap-
proach to removing sanctions, whereby individu-
al measures are progressively lifted in reciproca-
tion for the target’s steps towards compliance with 
a previously agreed roadmap. In the context of the 
CFSP, by contrast, the gradual phasing out of sanc-
tions has been piloted only in a few recent instanc-
es, and still needs to be matured. The EU’s phas-
ing out of the Myanmar sanctions, while gradual, 
features an abrupt transition from a first easing, 
which entails only the suspension of the visa ban, 
to a daring second easing, which suspends every-
thing but the arms embargo. 
The Intricacies of EU Decision-Making
The EU’s initial reaction to President Thein Sein’s 
reforms was cautious and its easing of sanctions 
was accordingly timid. Its response combined a 
limited suspension of sanctions and a resumption 
of development aid. Already in April 2011 the EU 
had suspended the visa ban on selected members 
of the new government – those who had no affili-
ation with the military or were “essential for dia-
logue with the international community” accord-
ing to Common Position 2011/239/CFSP – and al-
lowed for the resumption of high-level meetings. 
In January 2012 the EU welcomed the “remark-
able progress” and extended the suspension of the 
visa ban to the president, cabinet, and parliamen-
tary speakers. It announced that a further easing 
of the measures would be made if progress contin-
ued, pointing to the upcoming by-elections sched-
uled for April 2012. Typically for the EU’s tradi-
tional strategy of combining “carrots and sticks,” 
the promises regarding the easing of sanctions 
were accompanied by pledges of aid. During his 
visit to Myanmar in February 2012, EU commis-
sioner for development Andris Piebalgs promised 
to increase aid. The EU offered funding to allevi-
ate poverty, to support peace initiatives with eth-
nic rebels, and to strengthen the rule of law and 
the capacity of civil society and the public admin-
istration. The sum announced by Catherine Ash-
ton during her visit amounts to 150 million euros 
for the period 2012–13 (Ashton 2012). The political 
willingness for a rapprochement was manifested 
in Piebalgs’s visit, which was preceded by a vis-
it from US secretary of state Hillary Clinton, along 
with several European ministers, and followed by 
EU Righ Representative Catherine Ashton’s visit 
to open an EU office in Yangon in late April 2012. 
At first glance, the strategy followed in the eas-
ing of sanctions is not self-evident. The coexis-
tence of sanctions with promises of increasingly 
generous development aid appears contradicto-
ry. The sequence followed in the imposition of the 
sanctions did not follow considerations of effica-
cy, and neither does their easing. The explanation 
is found in EU decision-making processes, rath-
er than in any underlying strategic reasoning: the 
EU enjoys more flexibility to increase aid than to 
remove restrictions embedded in Common Posi-
tions. Since the latter are legal instruments that are 
adopted unanimously, they are normally modi-
fied once all member states have reached a con-
sensus on whether and how to ease the measures. 
The result is often compromise solutions, espe-
cially in borderline cases where reforms are tim-
id and easily reversible. In international sanctions 
practice, senders have often set aside the employ-
ment of gradualism: fearful of stalling reform ef-
forts by showing apparent satisfaction with only 
suboptimal concessions, senders have frequent-
ly refrained from easing sanctions despite conces-
sions by the targets. This has in turn discouraged 
the targets from practicing continued compliance. 
Perfecting Strategies for Terminating Sanctions 
A consensus among EU member states on lift-
ing the arms embargo against Myanmar any time 
soon is highly unlikely. Arms embargoes are of-
ten the first measure to be imposed and the last 
to go. They are broadly considered to be conflict-
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prevention measures that contribute to preclud-
ing the recurrence of hostilities in post-conflict sit-
uations, and the EU routinely imposes them on 
regimes that employ violence against civilians. 
In the case of Myanmar, removing the measure at 
the current time would still be problematic from a 
human rights point of view; however, this embar-
go hardly worries the targeted leaders, who pro-
cure arms mainly from China as well as from Rus-
sia, Ukraine or Singapore. Removing the selective 
sanctions affecting the economy was the most sig-
nificant step the EU could take. Firstly, this step 
is desired more by Burmese leaders than regain-
ing their ability to visit the West: it constitutes a 
powerful incentive for a leadership eager to at-
tract foreign operators to a market largely domi-
nated by China (Welsh 2012). In addition, easing 
restrictions on exchanges with Myanmar such as 
the commodity embargoes and the ban on invest-
ment, loans and the export of equipment could 
contribute to revitalizing the economy. The EU 
is aware of this: recognizing the “vital contribu-
tion the private sector has to make to the devel-
opment” of Myanmar, it indicated that it “would 
welcome European companies exploring trade 
and investment opportunities” in its Council con-
clusions of 23 April 2012. By removing restrictions 
with a bearing on the economy (however limited), 
the EU has also addressed one of the most recur-
rent criticisms – justified or not – of its handling of 
the situation in Myanmar – namely, that its sanc-
tions contribute to worsening the country’s hu-
man rights situation and to further impoverishing 
the population (Boisseau du Rocher 2012). If the 
progress of reforms is reversed in the future, the 
possibility of reimposing the visa ban on the gov-
ernment remains open. 
Although the Council of Ministers of the EU 
indicated its support for reinstating the GSP in its 
conclusions of 23 April 2012, this is more difficult 
than removing CFSP sanctions. The resumption of 
trade privileges has to follow a different legal path 
under the Community pillar, the so-called “first 
pillar” of the EU which governs external trade re-
lations, given that it is technically a trade measure. 
To make things worse, this mechanism has never 
been activated as no attempts have yet been made 
to reverse the only two existing cases of with-
drawal: Myanmar and Belarus. However, the Bur-
mese leadership has already made contact with 
the ILO in order to cooperate in the eradication of 
forced labor as a first step towards the resumption 
of trade privileges. 
In the context of EU sanctions practice, the 
Myanmar sanctions regime stands out as anoma-
lous: within a little more than one year, the most 
far-reaching of the EU’s sanctions packages has 
been suspended in its virtual entirety. But in view 
of the small number of successes recorded in the 
still short history of targeted sanctions, Myanmar 
also emerges as a test case. Terminating sanctions 
wisely could have the effect of reassuring oth-
er targets – such as Belarus or Zimbabwe – of the 
Council’s willingness to lift sanctions if the targets 
conduct the desired reforms. 
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